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I. INTRODUCTION
Transporting goods worth over five thousand dollars, which are
known to be stolen, in interstate commerce is a violation of the Federal
National Stolen Property Act (NSPA).' The congressional intent behind
the NSPA is to aid the states in punishing those who commit theft, fraud,
or counterfeiting in violation of state law, but elude punishment by
utilizing the channels of interstate commerce.2 Congress included an
interstate transportation element in this statute, which is otherwise
parallel to a typical state stolen property statute, merely to supply a
constitutional basis for the exertion of federal power.' Thus, Congress
enacted the NSPA as a means through which federal authority could be
invoked to fill gaps in state prosecutorial authority caused by crimes that
are interstate in nature. For example, under this law a thief who steals
in New Mexico and transports the stolen goods to California is not
beyond the reach of the law if the prosecutorial efforts of either state
prove futile. Instead, through the NSPA, the thief may be brought to
justice under the umbrella of federal power.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994). For an annotated discussion of the types of activities
considered by the federal courts as within the range of "interstate transportation," see
Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Necessity in Prosecution Under 18 U.S.C.S. § 2314 for
Interstate Transportation of Securities Obtained by Fraud That Specific Securities Have
Moved in hIterstate Commerce, 48 A.L.R. FED. 570 (1980); 66 AM. JUR. 2D Receiving
and Transporting Stolen Property § 42 (1973).
2. McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 659 (1982) ("Through § 2314,
Congress has sought to aid the States in their detection and punishment of criminals who
evade state authorities by using the channels of interstate commerce."); United States v.
Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379, 384 (1946) (holding that the NSPA "contemplated coming to the
aid of the states in detecting and punishing criminals whose offenses are complete under
state law, but who utilize the channels of interstate commerce to make a successful
getaway and thus make the state's detecting and punitive processes impotent").
3. United States v. Scarborough, 813 F.2d 1244, 1245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding that Congress did not intend to "relate interstate movement to the culpability of
the underlying criminal acts"); United States v. Newson, 531 F.2d 979, 981 (10th Cir.
1976) ("The essence of the offense is the fraudulent scheme itself and the interstate
element is only included to provide a constitutional basis for the exercise of federal
jurisdiction."); United States v. Ludwig, 523 F.2d 705, 707-08 (8th Cir. 1975) ("The
sole reason for conditioning the statutes' prohibitions upon use of interstate commerce is
to provide a constitutional basis for the exercise of federal power." (quoting United
States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 891 (9th Cir. 1970))); Roselli, 432 F.2d at 891
("[Slection 2314 is aimed at the evils of theft, fraud, and counterfeiting and not at the
regulation of interstate transportation.").
4. In most instances the criminal causes the unlawfully obtained good to travel in
interstate commerce in order to dispose of it or to conceal the fraud. It is likely that it
will be difficult for the states to prosecute this type of crime because they will not be
able to investigate fully and may not be able to compel witnesses to testify. See
McElroy, 455 U.S. at 655 n.19 (discussing interstate transportation of stolen checks).
Thus, federal jurisdiction power is used to bridge the gaps in state power and ensure that
a full prosecution is possible. For an illustrative look at the increasing federalization of
crime, see Note, Mens Rea in Federal Criminal Law, I l I HARV. L. REv. 2402 (1998).
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Beyond punishing people who actually transport stolen goods in
interstate commerce, Congress chose to punish people who cause
interstate transportation of such goods. Criminal liability for causing
federal crimes is created by 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), also known as the "causing
alternative."5 Thus, under federal law a person who causes a crime can
be charged as if he committed the crime himself.' In addition, for
purposes of the causing alternative, it does not matter whether the person
who carries out the crime happens to be an innocent intermediary. For
example, if while in California Fast Eddie sells a fraudulently acquired
ring to Joe who is unaware of the fraud, and Joe brings the ring home to
New York, then Fast Eddie is criminally liable for a violation of the
NSPA. By selling the ring, Fast Eddie caused it to move in interstate
commerce in violation of the NSPA.8 It makes no difference in the
outcome-even if Joe had no idea that the ring was in fact stolen.
Conceptually, these laws reflect a rather straightforward principle:
transporting stolen goods in interstate commerce is a crime; therefore
causing this crime to happen is equivalent to committing the crime itself.
Congress, via the causing alternative, sought to ensure that those
individuals who orchestrate, but refrain from actually performing,
criminal activity would not go unpunished.'
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1994). Criminal causation liability e.isted prior to the
passage of the causing alternative in 1948, but it specifically had to be provided for in
the individual statute creating the offense. See id. revision notes.
6. By definition, a causer is charged as a principal; thus, a charge for causing a
crime is in no way different than a charge for committing the crime itself. See id.
7. Id
[The causing alternative] removes all doubt that one who puts in motion or
assists in the illegal enterprise but causes the commission of an indispensable
element of the offense by an innocent agent or instrumentality, is guilty as a
principal even though he intentionally refrained from the direct act constituting
the completed offense.
Id.
8. In distancing himself from the "hot" ring, Fast Eddie has set the crime in
motion. He is liable for the crime, despite the fact that he did not actually do any
transporting.
9. It is interesting to note that if, instead of being unaware, Joe knew% the ring was
stolen, then Fast Eddie and Joe could be charged with the same offense. Joe would bz
charged with a violation of the NSPA and Fast Eddie's charge, via causation liability,
would be identical.
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) revision notes. See generally G. Robert Blakey & Kevin
P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and Impact on
Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability Under RICO, 33 A.%t.
Cpi. L. REv. 1345, 1410-15 (1996) (discussing criminal accomplice liability under IS
U.S.C. § 2(b)).
Despite the relatively simple character of the overall statutory scheme
enacted by Congress, the federal appellate courts are in disagreement as
to how to apply the law in any given case. Namely, these courts
disagree as to whether the prosecution must prove that a defendant
charged with causing a violation of the NSPA acted with a culpable
mental state, commonly referred to as mens rea, in relation to the
interstate transportation element of the crime." Mens rea rules
traditionally require the prosecution to prove that the defendant acted
with the requisite level of mental knowledge or culpability'2 in regard to
each material element of the crime to which the mental requirement
attaches.1
3
In the NSPA context, a judicially constructed mens rea constraint, if
enforced, would require a showing that the defendant actually knew or
11. Generally a crime is made up of an "actus reus," a physical act that produces
the deed, and a "mens rea," a guilty mind that produces the act. 21 AM. JUR. 2D
Criminal Law § 126 (1998) (annotated discussion of mens rea); see also United States v.
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980) ("In the criminal law, both a culpable mens rea
and a criminal actus reus are generally required for an offense to occur."). The common
law rule that mens rea was a necessary element of every crime was modified by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922), with respect to
prosecutions under statutes. Whether mens rea is an element of a statutory offense is a
question of legislative intent to be construed by the courts. Id. A mens rea requirement
is usually created in a statute through the insertion of such words as "intentional,"
"willful," "knowing," "fraudulent," or "malicious." Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 264 (1952). Additionally, punishing a person for an act in violation of law
when the person is ignorant of the facts making it so does not deny due process of law.
Balint, 258 U.S. at 252. For articles discussing criminal mens rea requirements, see
Larry Alexander & Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes, 87 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1138 (1997) (exploring mens rea requirements as they pertain to
inchoate crimes, i.e., conspiracy and attempt); Martin R. Gardner, The Melts Rea
Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present,
1993 UTAH L. REV. 635 (detailing the evolution of mens rea requirements in criminal
law); Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme
Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 859 (1999)
(analyzing the constitutional status of mens rea requirements); John Shepard Wiley Jr.,
Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation,
85 VA. L. REV. 1021 (1999) (discussing the interpretation of federal criminal statutes and
evaluating the rule of mandatory culpability enforced by the Supreme Court); Matthew
T. Fricker & Kelly Gilchrist, Comment, United States v. Nofziger and the Revision of 18
U.S. C. § 207: The Need for a New Approach to the Mens Rea Requirements of Federal
Criminal Law, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 803 (1990) (advocating the need for reform of
mens rea in federal criminal statutes).
12. For a commonly accepted overview and categorization of mental states, see
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985). Generally, there are four increasing levels of mens
rea: negligence, recklessness, knowledge, and purpose. Id. The mens rea levels
implicated by the issues in this Comment are generally limited to knowledge and
purpose.
13. The relevant portion of the NSPA contains only one explicit word signifying a
mens rea requirement. That word is "knowing," which attaches a mens rea requirement
to knowing that the goods are in fact stolen. See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994). For a
complete discussion, see infra Part III.A.
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intended that the goods would travel across state lines." As it turns out,
most circuit courts have held that there is no mens rea requirement
attached to the interstate transportation element of the crime.'" In cases
where the mens rea element of the crime is rejected, mere proof that the
defendant caused interstate transportation of the stolen good is enough to
convict.'6 There is no inquiry into what the defendant actually knew.
Other courts hold that, at a minimum, the prosecution must show that the
defendant could have reasonably foreseen that the goods would travel
interstate." Only a small number of courts actually enforce the mens rea
requirement. 8
The resolution of this issue is of critical importance to those charged
with causing violations of the NSPA. If there is no mens rea
requirement attached to the interstate transportation element, it will be
considerably easier to convict potential defendants of causing these
crimes.19 The Supreme Court has consistently warned that it is not the
province of the judiciary to enlarge the scope of criminal laws as enacted
14. The inquiry would focus on the subjective mental state of the actor. In other
words, the state must show that the defendant knew the goods would travel interstate or
that he intended to cause them to travel interstate. See United States v. Leppo, 177 F.3d
93, 96-97 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing the potential level of mental culpability a mens rea
requirement would create if attached to the interstate transportation element of the
crime). For example, in the hypothetical involving Fast Eddie, a mens rea requirement
of knowledge would require the prosecution to show that Fast Eddie knew Joe would
take the ring to New York. If the mens rea level is purpose, it would require a showing
that Fast Eddie directed Joe to take the ring across state lines to New York.
15. E.g., United States v. Powers, 437 F.2d 1160, 1161 (9th Cir. 1971) ("There is
no requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 that the accused know, foresee, or intend that
instrumentalities of interstate commerce will be used."). For a complete listing of all the
circuits which reject the mens rea requirement, see infra note 49. See also 66 AM JUR.
2D Receiving and Transporting Stolen Property § 41 (1973) (discussing the
transportation element of 18 U.S.C. § 2314).
16. See, e.g., infra note 48 and accompanying text.
17. E.g., United States v. Masters, 456 F.2d 1060. 1061-62 (9th Cir. 1972) ("The
actor is at least responsible under the statute for the reasonably foreseeable consequences
of his acts.").
18. See, e.g., Leppo, 177 F.3d at 96-97 (holding that interstate transportation must
be "wilful").
19. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 264 (1952) ("Congress has been
alert to what often is a decisive function of some mental element in crime."). If there is
no mental state attached to the interstate transportation of the crime, the simple fact that
the stolen good crossed a state boundary will be sufficient proof. This lessened burden
of proof might dictate the outcome of the case. The only other elements that the
prosecution would have to prove is that the stolen goods were worth over five thousand
dollars and that the defendant knew the goods were in fact stolen. For a complete
discussion breaking down the statutory elements of the crime, see infra Part II1.A.
by Congress.0 Thus, in the present context it is imperative that the
federal courts forego the mental state requirement, as it applies to
interstate transportation, only if they find clear evidence that Congress
affirmatively intended to do away with it altogether, or if they find that
interstate transportation is not a material element of the substantive
crime. Otherwise, the courts must presume that Congress intended to
require a showing of mens rea for all material elements of the statutory
23crime.
This Comment advocates for a uniform rule of prosecution in accord
with the underlying goals of the statutory scheme created by Congress.
Given the interstate nature of the crime, potential defendants should be
tried in the same manner as those tried in various federal jurisdictions."
20. In Morissette, the Supreme Court held that the federal courts should not
enlarge the reach of federal statutory crimes. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263. The Court
stated this duty in the following terms: "The spirit of the doctrine which denies the
federal judiciary power to create crimes forthrightly admonishes that we should not
enlarge the reach of enacted crimes by constituting them from anything less than the
incriminating components contemplated by the words used in the statute." Id. (internal
citation omitted).
21. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978)
("[F]ar more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory
definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement."); Morissette,
342 U.S. at 263 ("We hold that mere omission from [the statute] of any mention of intent
will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced."). Thus, in
order to defeat the traditional presumption in favor of a mental state it must be shown
that Congress affirmatively wished to dispense with the mental state requirement. See
United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 438. For more on the presumption in favor of mens
rea requirements used by the Supreme Court, see Wiley, supra note I1, at 1021-25
(characterizing the Supreme Court's rationale as the rule of mandatory culpability).
22. Mental states are not applicable to elements of federal statutory crimes, which
are jurisdictional only in nature. See, e.g., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676-77
n.9 (1975). In Feola, the Supreme Court held that a charge of violating the federal
officer assault statute did not require proof that the defendant knew his victim was a
federal officer. Id. at 684. This element of the crime was held to be jurisdictional only
in nature. See id. at 676-86. For a complete discussion of the Feola case, see infra Part
II.B.
23. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994) ("Our
reluctance to simply follow the most grammatical reading of the statute is heightened by
our cases interpreting criminal statutes to include broadly applicable [mens real
requirements, even where the statute by its terms does not contain them."); Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263; United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922).
24. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
25. The mens rea requirement may have a decisive effect on the outcome of the
case. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Given that the courts disagree as to
whether they will impose the mens rea requirements, the probability of inconsistent
prosecutions is high. For example, in the Fast Eddie hypothetical (Joe is knowledgeable
of the fraud variation), assume that Fast Eddie is tried in a California federal court and
Joe in a New York federal court. If the Ninth Circuit enforces the mens rea rule and the
Second Circuit does not, then there is a high probability that Joe may escape liability,
while Fast Eddie will be convicted, even though both are equally culpable for the crime.
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The verdicts in these cases should not depend upon such an arbitrary
variable as the court in which the charges are brought.
The central issue this Comment addresses is whether the prosecution
is required to prove a culpable mental state in relation to the
transportation element when charging defendants with causing violations
of the NSPA. This Comment concludes that Congress did not intend a
mens rea requirement to attach to the interstate transportation element of
the crime. The ongoing confusion surrounding the mens rea requirement
must be resolved so that the individual circuits will apply a consistent
and coherent rule in each and every case,:" thereby eliminating the
possibility of inconsistent verdicts.
Part II begins by highlighting the points of divergence among the
federal circuit courts. This serves as a valuable overview to the different
modes of analysis employed by the various courts. These conflicting
analyses in turn lead to inconsistent outcomes on the mens rea issue.
This confusion among the courts will, in addition to outlining the basic
problem, serve to underscore the need for an authoritative resolution by
the Supreme Court or Congress on the matter.2'
Part I further analyzes the problem by breaking down the penal
code,' discussing the differing statutory constructions offered by
individual courts,z9 and analyzing the practical consequences of those
statutory interpretations.' In particular, how a court interprets the
language and each of the individual elements of the statutes at issue vill
determine the ultimate result a court will reach, that is, whether there is a
mens rea requirement.
26. For an illustrative example of the confusion the mens rea issue has created. see
United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 891 (9th Cir. 1970). The Ninth Circuit held that
no mental state applied to the transportation element because it was not a material
element of the offense. Il Two years later, the same court decided United States r.
Masters, 456 F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 1972). After citing to Roselli as precedent. the Masters
court went on to hold that the actor was only responsible for interstate transportation that
was reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 1061. The court confused the issue: if an element is
not material then no mens rea is applicable and there is no need to venture into an
inquiry as to whether the interstate transportation was reasonably foreseeable.
27. The Supreme Court can easily solve the problem by ruling that the
transportation element is not a material element of the crime and only junsdictional in
nature. Alternatively, Congress can solve the problem by modifying the statutory
language. For a complete discussion of possible solutions, see infra Part VII.
28. The relevant portions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314. 2(b) (1994) will be addressed.
29. For a concise summary of the three primary interpretations of the statutory
scheme created by Congress, see infra Part VI.
30. In this case, the potential outcomes are polar opposites: either a mens rea is
required or it is not; there is no in-between position.
Part IV follows this analysis by evaluating Pereira v. United States,"
the most recent Supreme Court decision directly addressing mens rea as
it relates to the transportation element under the NSPA.3 Part V
continues the analysis by illustrating the present inadequacies of the
Court's narrow holding in Pereira. This narrow decision has added to
the confusion among the federal courts of appeal; the lack of clear
guidance by the Supreme Court lends itself to differing interpretations of
what the law requires. In short, Parts IV and V further underscore the
need for the Supreme Court to revisit and reevaluate its decision in
Pereira so that the problem of inconsistent verdicts in the federal courts
may be avoided.
Part VI evaluates the competing views on the mens rea issue and
concludes that the mens rea required argument is not tenable. This
Comment argues that Congress intended the interstate transportation
element of the crime to be a source for federal jurisdiction only and that
it is not a material element of the crime." Therefore, since it is not a
material element of the crime, judicially constructed mens rea
requirements are not applicable to it.
Part VII concludes by addressing the need for an authoritative
decision on the matter.' 4 The Supreme Court could easily lay the
statutory construction issue to rest by adopting a specific rule of
statutory interpretation. A better alternative would be for Congress to
step in to clarify the statutory language. After all, Congress is supposed
to be in charge of making the rules. Future code revisers should take
notice of the inconsistencies among the courts and make the necessary
clarifications. If Congress intended a mens rea requirement to apply to
the interstate transportation element of the crime, it should clarify its
position by inserting the relevant statutory language." If no mens rea
requirement was intended, Congress should strike the language
31. 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
32. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions involving the NSPA have not addressed
this particular issue but rather have dealt with other issues involving construction of the
NSPA. E.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 105 (1990) (holding that a
defendant who received genuine vehicle titles, knowing that they incorporated
fraudulently tendered odometer readings, violated the NSPA if he knew they were
"falsely made"); McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 653-54 (1982) (holding that
the NSPA is effective at any and all times during the movement of the good in interstate
commerce); Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 517 (1960) (holding that shipments
may be aggregated to satisfy the monetary limit when they have enough relationship that
they may be charged as a single offense).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Ludwig, 523 F.2d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding
that state transportation is "merely the linchpin for federal jurisdiction").
34. See infra Part VII.
35. Inserting the word "knowingly" to modify the clause, "transports, transmits, or
transfers in interstate or foreign commerce" in 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994) would support
this position.
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suggestive of a mental state from the causing alternative provision
altogether.3 In effect this measure would end any plausible claim that
there is a mens rea requirement attached to the interstate transportation
element of the crime."
II. THE ALL BUT BURIED MENS REA QUESTION RESURFACES
In United States v. Leppo," the First Circuit Court of Appeals revived
an issue that had been inconsistently decided for over forty-five years."
In a straightforward manner, the Leppo court admirably tried to
reconcile ambiguous congressional language,0 inadequate Supreme
Court precedent,4 ' and wildly inconsistent circuit court standards."
Specifically, the Leppo court attempted to decide whether or not there
was a mens rea requirement for causing violations of the NSPA.
Unfortunately, the Leppo court fell short, and reached a mistaken
conclusion, because it was lured into the same pitfalls that claimed its
predecessors. Those pitfalls, as the following paragraphs suggest, are
36. In particular the word "willfully" must be stricken from 18 U.S.C. § 2(b)
(1994). For a complete discussion elaborating on the significance of the word
"willfully" in 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), see infra Part IIm.A. See generally Blakey & Roddy,
supra note 10, at 1410-15 (discussing "willfully" as applied under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b)).
37. It is important that Congress revise the statutory language instead of merely
offering opinions on it, because the views of a present Congress as to the meaning of an
act passed by an earlier Congress are not ordinarily of great weight in statutory
construction. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64,77 n.6 (1994).
38. 177 F.3d 93 (1st Cir. 1999).
39. The First Circuit began its analysis by pointing out the "wide national
disagreement on this important subject." Id at 95. After describing the leading circuit
court cases, which had enforced the no mens rea rule, the First Circuit boldly stated that
it had "cited these cases to indicate the mistreatment of this subject and not to influence
[its] own decision." Id. at 95-96.
40. The question was whether the language in the causing alternative, particularly
the word "willfully," created a mens rea requirement attached to the interstate
transportation element of the crime. For a detailed discussion addressing the
significance of the word "willfully" in the causing alternative, see infra Part ll.B.
41. In Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9 (1954), the Supreme Court, in its
only applicable decision to date, rendered a decision limited only to the facts of the case.
Thus, it did not answer the mens rea issue. For a complete discussion of the Pereira
case, see infra Part IV.
42. The federal appellate courts are not in agreement as to whether there is a mens
rea requirement attached to the interstate transportation element of the crime. See Leppo,
177 F.3d at 95-97 (describing the leading cases of several circuits which are not
consistent in reasoning or outcome).
43. The First Circuit came to the conclusion that the word "willfully" in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(b) created a mens rea requirement of intent attached to the transportation element of
18 U.S.C § 2314. See id. at 96-97.
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embodied by the judicial preoccupation with the specific statutory
language that Congress chose and the failure to look at the overall
purposes Congress had in passing the law.
In Leppo, the defendants were charged with causing violations of the
NSPA, after the stolen polyester commercial film they sold to an
unsuspecting buyer traveled across state lines.' The defendant admitted
he knew the goods were stolen and accepted the factual allegations in the
indictment. His sole defense was that there was not a proper showing of
mens rea as to the interstate transportation of the film. 45 In other words,
the defendant claimed that the government was required to prove that he
had intended to cause the film to travel from Massachusetts to
Connecticut when he sold it to the innocent buyer. The defendant was
convicted because there was evidence that he knew the buyer was from
out of state and he sold film to him on four previous occasions. 6 Thus,
the defendant would have been guilty with or without a mens rea
requirement because the facts warranted an inference that he manifested
the subjective intent to cause the interstate transportation. 7
The greater importance of the Leppo case is that the First Circuit
interpreted the statutory scheme created by Congress as creating a mens
rea requirement attaching to the interstate transportation element of the
statutory crime, a conclusion traditionally rejected by a majority of the
circuit courts 9 In reaching this conclusion, the Leppo court argued that
44. In Leppo, the defendant purchased quantities of commercial polyester film that
he did not intend to pay for, had them delivered to his Massachusetts place of business,
and then sold the film to a Connecticut buyer who was ignorant of the fraud. Id. at 95.
The buyer picked up the film and took it back to Connecticut. Id. The defendant
claimed he did not intend to cause the film to cross state lines. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 97.
47. Id. ("The agreed facts warranted an inference that, in picking an out-of-state
buyer on four occasions, defendant, with hot goods, affirmatively intended to distance
them from himself.").
48. Id. at 96-97.
49. The circuit courts that conclusively reject the attachment of a mens rea
requirement to the transportation element of the crime are: the Fifth Circuit, see United
States v. Lennon, 751 F.2d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 1985); the Sixth Circuit, see United States
v. White, 451 F.2d 559, 559-60 (6th Cir. 1971); the Seventh Circuit, see United States v.
Lack, 129 F.3d 403, 409-10 (7th Cir. 1997); the Eighth Circuit, see United States v.
Ludwig, 523 F.2d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 1975); the Tenth Circuit, see United States v.
Newson, 531 F.2d 979, 980-81 (10th Cir. 1976); and the D.C. Circuit, see United States
v. Scarborough, 813 F.2d 1244, 1245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Second Circuit purports
to reject a mens rea requirement, see United States v. Mingoia, 424 F.2d 710, 713 (2d
Cir. 1970). For subsequent authority to the contrary, see United States v. DeKunchak,
467 F.2d 432, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1972). The same is also true for the Ninth Circuit.
Compare United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 891 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that
"knowing interstate transportation is not an essential element of a violation of section
2314"), with United States v. Masters, 456 F.2d 1060, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding
that an "actor is at least responsible under the statute for the reasonably foreseeable
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the causing alternative was the sole source for criminal causation
liability."" The court further argued that the language in the causing
alternative created a mental state requirement that attached to the
interstate transportation element of the crime."
As the title of this section suggests, the Leppo court revived an old
issue, which a large majority of the circuit courts thought was settled.'"
The majority of the circuit courts have held that no mens rea attached to
the interstate transportation element of the crime." As previously noted,
the only express mens rea requirement on the face of the statute applies
to the knowledge that the goods were in fact stolen.- In the absence of
any language that clearly establishes a mens rea requirement for the
transportation element, the majority of circuit courts reasons that
evidence that the good traveled in interstate commerce is enough proof
to satisfy that element of the crime.'
A. The Minority Lures the Majorit), into the Pitfall
The majority of federal circuit courts, as this Comment argues, reach
the appropriate ultimate conclusion. There is no mens rea requirement
attached to causing interstate transportation of stolen goods. However,
the paths these courts have traveled in reaching their final decisions
have, at times, served to further confuse the issue. This section
explains how some courts reaching the no mens rea rule are lured into
faulty analysis when they attempt to engage in a tit-for-tat argument
against the minority position. This faulty analysis leads to wildly
consequences of his acts").
50. See Leppo, 177 F.3d at 94-95. For a fully considered treatment of this
argument, see infra Part ]II.B.
51. Leppo, 177 F.3d at 96-97.
52. Prior to Leppo, there was only one major case ruling on the interstate
transportation mens rea issue since the late 1980s. See Lack, 129 F.3d at 409-10.
53. See supra note 49.
54. See infra Part ]I.A.
55. For this proposition the majority of courts cite to the Supreme Court decision
in Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954), which held that "ltlo constitute a violation
of these provisions [18 U.S.C. §§ 2314,2(b)], it is not necessary to show that petitioners
actually mailed or transported anything themselves; it is sufficient if they caused it to be
done." Id. at 8.
56. For a brief summary outlining the three major methods used to arrive at the no
mens rea required rule, see hifta Part VI.
57. This back and forth debate takes the form of arguing vhether the exact
language in the causing alternative creates a mens rea requirement attached to the
transportation element of the crime.
varying justifications for enforcing the no mens rea rule. The confusion
seems to snowball, as the mens rea rule is seemingly given credence
even by the courts that ultimately reject the rule.
In more concrete terms, the debate centered originally on whether the
courts should read a mens rea requirement into the interstate
transportation element of the crime. In the early case of Pereira v.
United States,8 the Supreme Court seemed to take the position that
intent, or at the very least reasonable foreseeability, was required in
connection with the interstate transportation element of the crime. 9 This
focused early attention as to whether the language on the face of the
NSPA created a mental state. The majority of the circuit courts held that
it did not.' The courts in favor of mens rea later shifted the inquiry and
argued that the language in the causing alternative, as applied to the
NSPA, created a mens rea requirement.
61
The language in the causing alternative arguably creates a mens rea
requirement.6' Focused primarily on the question of whether the
language in the causing alternative created a mental state, courts
attacking the mental state position were lured into addressing the wrong
question. The point here is that in preoccupying themselves with the
mens rea statutory language construction question, many courts, on both
sides of the issue, addressed the wrong issue. The correct issue, as the
following section illustrates, was whether it was proper to attach a mens
rea requirement to the interstate transportation element in the first
58. 347 U.S. 1(1954).
59. Id. at 9. The court upheld the defendants' convictions based upon the
following logical assumption:
When Pereira delivered the check, drawn on an out-of-state bank, to the El
Paso bank for collection, he "caused" it to be transported in interstate
commerce. It is common knowledge that such checks must be sent to the
drawee bank for collection, and it follows that Pereira intended the El Paso
bank to send this check across state lines.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. See supra note 49.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1968),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969)
("[T]he causer as a principal has been eliminated from 18 U.S.C. § 2314, and since the
1951 amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) has required that the defendant wilfully cause the
forbidden act to be done.").
62. The debate surrounds the significance of the word "willfully" in 18 U.S.C. §
2(b) (1994). Traditionally, the word "willfully" creates a mental state requirement. See
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994). Willfully is a "word of many
meanings" and the construction given to it many times is "influenced by its context." Id.
(quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943)); see also 1 WORKING PAPERS
OF NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 148-51 (1970)
(providing an annotated discussion of Supreme Court treatment of willfully in federal
statutes) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS]. For an extended discussion of "willfully" in the
causing alternative context, see Blakey & Roddy, supra note 10, at 1410-15.
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place. ' Stated differently, is interstate transportation a material element
of the offense?
B. Jurisdictional v. Jurisdictional Only
Many of the circuit courts, regardless of the merits of their arguments,
simply were addressing the wrong question in their analysis of the
problem. In the mid 1970s, some of the circuits eventually caught on to
the real issue at play in these cases, which is the jurisdictional nature of
the transportation element of the NSPA.6' The real issue is not the
interpretation of the language contained in the statute; instead the true
inquiry concerns the purpose Congress had in enacting the law.'
It is not coincidental that some circuit courts changed their analysis
contemporaneously with the landmark Supreme Court decision
regarding the construction of mens rea requirements in federal statutes.'
In United States v Feola,67 the Supreme Court addressed the mens rea
issue as it relates to 18 U.S.C. § 111,6 which criminalizes the assault of
a federal officer while in the performance of his official duties' The
63. Some elements of the crime are not considered material elements; they do not
relate to the underlying culpability of the act. Rather, they are "jurisdictional only" in
nature. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676-77 n.9 (1975). If the element is
jurisdictional only in nature, in the absence of explicit statutory language, the courts
cannot read in a mens rea requirement. See id. at 676-86.
64. The Ninth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to recognize that the
transportation element of the NSPA was jurisdictional only and thus no mental state
applied. United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 891 (9th Cir. 1970). But see United
States v. Masters, 456 F.2d 1060, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that at the very least
a mens rea of reasonable foreseeability attaches to the transportation element of the
crime). The Eighth Circuit was the first to conclude authoritatively that the
transportation element was jurisdictional only in nature. See United States v. Ludwig.
523 F.2d 705, 706-08 (8th Cir. 1975). The Tenth Circuit followed the Eighth Circuit
one year later. See United States v. Newson, 531 F.2d 979, 981 (10th Cir. 1976).
65. In the absence of clear congressional language attaching a mens rea
requirement to a particular element of the crime, it becomes a question of legislative
intent for the courts to decide. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250. 251-52 (1922);
see also Ludivig, 523 F.2d at 706 ("Vhether [18 U.S.C. § 2314] requires. at a minimum
that such interstate transportation be reasonably foreseeable is, of course, a question of
congressional intent.").
66. Ludwig, 523 F.2d 705, was decided about seven months after the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Feola, 420 U.S. 671. Although the Ludwig court did not
specifically cite to Feola, the principles espoused by the Eighth Circuit were likely
influenced by the Supreme Court's decision. See Ludwirg, 523 F.2d at 707-08.
67. 420 U.S. 671 (1975).
68. 18U.S.C.§ 111 (1994&Supp.IV 1999).
69. See id. In Feola, the defendants were convicted of assaulting, and conspiring
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statute contained no express mens rea language relating to the "federal
officer" element of the crime.70 The main issue in the case was whether
an independent mens rea requirement should be read into the federal
officer element of the crime.7' Stated differently, was the prosecution
required to show that the defendants knew that their victims were federal
officers?
In Feola, the Supreme Court held that Congress inserted the federal
officer element into 18 U.S.C. § I 11, which otherwise was a general
assault statute, in order to ensure that assaults against specified federal
officers did not go unpunished.72 Given the congressional purpose
behind the law, the jurisdictional nature of the element, and the absence
of language stating otherwise, the federal officer element of the crime
was defined as being jurisdictional only, and thus a mens rea
requirement was not applicable.73 In a key footnote, the court elaborated
on this view:
Indeed, a requirement is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts for
what otherwise are state crimes precisely because it implicates factors that are
an appropriate subject for federal concern. With respect to the present case, for
example, a mere general policy of deterring assaults would probably prove to be
an undesirable or insufficient basis for federal jurisdiction; but where Congress
seeks to protect the integrity of federal functions and the safety of federal
officers, the interest is sufficient to warrant federal involvement. The
significance of labeling a statutory requirement as "jurisdictional" is not that the
requirement is viewed as outside the scope of the evil Congress intended to
forestall, but merely that the existence of the fact that confers federal
jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates
the act made criminal by the federal statute. The question, then, is not whether
the requirement is jurisdictional, but whether it is jurisdictional only.
74
to assault, undercover narcotics officers while in the performance of their official duties.
420 U.S. at 671.
70. The statute reads: "Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes,
intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while
engaged in or on account of the performance of his official duties, shall be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both." 18 U.S.C § 111
(1948) (stating the statute as it read in 1975, prior to its 1988 amendment). Note the
absence of "knowingly," or any analogous words, in the statute.
71. The precise issue raised by the defendants was whether the mental state should
be read into the conspiracy charge only, but the court addressed the application of a mens
rea requirement to the substantive charge as well. Feola, 420 U.S. at 676-77.
72. Id. at 681 ("Congress clearly was concerned with the safety of federal officers
insofar as it was tied to the efficacy of law enforcement activities.").
73. Id. at 684.
We conclude, from all this, that in order to effectuate the congressional
purpose of according maximum protection to federal officers by making
prosecution for assaults upon them cognizable in the federal courts, § Ill
cannot be construed as embodying an unexpressed requirement that an
assailant be aware that his victim is a federal officer.
Id.
74. Id. at 676-77 n.9 (emphasis added).
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According to the Feola principle, in order to determine whether a
requirement that is jurisdictional in nature is jurisdictional only, the
adjudicating court must look at the congressional purposes behind the
statute and determine whether a mens rea requirement would frustrate
those purposes. In Feola, the court determined that a strict mens rea
requirement would have frustrated the policy of protecting federal law
enforcement officers because it would have made it tougher to convict
defendants committing these offenses. 71 Therefore, the Court decided to
treat the federal officer element as jurisdictional only. No showing of
mens rea was necessary.
The Feola jurisdictional only principle applies with equal, if not
greater, force to the issue under consideration in this Comment. The
congressional purpose in passing the NSPA was first authoritatively
interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Sheridan." In
Sheridan, the Court stated that the purpose behind the NSPA was to
come to the aid of the states in punishing those who use the channels of
interstate commerce to escape the reach of state law." The interstate
transportation element of the NSPA has been characterized subsequently
by some circuits as being merely the "linchpin" for federal jurisdiction,'
and not a material element of the offense. "
The transportation element of the NSPA may actually be an even
stronger case for jurisdictional only status than the federal officer
provision of 18 U.S.C. § 111, which was at issue in Feola itself. In
Feola, the dissent raised legitimate doubts that the federal officer assault
statute had other possible purposes behind it not consistent with the
75. Id. at 684 ("All the statute requires is an intent to assault, not an intent to
assault a federal officer. A contrary conclusion would give insufficient protection to the
agent enforcing an unpopular law, and none to the agent acting under cover.").
76. 329 U.S. 379 (1946). The decision was rendered two years before the code
was revised in 1948. Although stylistic changes were made, no changes in the overall
substance of the law have been made since. See discussion infra Part III.A.
77. Sheridan, 329 U.S. at 384. The Supreme Court summed up the congressional
purpose behind the NSPA as follows:
Congress had in mind preventing further frauds or the completion of frauds
partially executed. But it also contemplated coming to the aid of the states in
detecting and punishing criminals whose offenses are complete under state
law, but who utilize the channels of interstate commerce to make a successful
getaway and thus make the state's detecting and punitive processes impotent.
Id.
78. United States v. Ludwig, 523 F.2d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 1975); accord United
States v. Scarborough, 813 F.2d 1244, 1245-46 (D.C Cir. 1987) (quoting Lhdfvw., 52-
F.2d at 707).
79. See cases cited supra note 3 and accompanying text.
federal officer element being jurisdictional only. 0 In the NSPA context
there are no potentially inconsistent purposes."' The transportation
element was provided in the NSPA for the single purpose of making
sure that criminals are not able to evade the reach of the law entirely by
taking advantage of the gaps in state power.2  The transportation
element is not meant to be a device that aggravates punishment or
creates a new crime which punishes otherwise innocent conduct."1
Instead, it strictly provides a basis to subject these criminals to federal
jurisdiction. Imposing a strict mens rea requirement on this element of
the crime would be contrary to Congress's objectives in passing the law
because it would make it harder to punish those who elude state law.
To recapitulate, the sole purpose of the NSPA is to fill gaps in state
criminal authority. The NSPA parallels a state law, but it includes an
interstate component to provide a jurisdictional basis for the exercise of
federal power.' 4 There is no explicit statutory language creating a mens
rea requirement that attaches to the transportation element of the crime. "
The judicial construction of a strict mens rea requirement would be
contrary to the goals of Congress in passing the law itself. Therefore,
the transportation element is jurisdictional only. Since the transportation
element is jurisdictional only, no mental state can be attached to it.
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE COURTS ARE NOT
CONSISTENT IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
POSED BY THE TRANSPORTATION ELEMENT
Up to this point the discussion has made reference, in general terms, to
80. See Feola, 420 U.S. at 696-713 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent argued
that the statute was not merely a parallel to a state law punishing the assault of law
enforcement officers. Id. at 697-700. Instead, the dissent argued, the law was written as
a federal aggravated assault law. Id. at 697-99. According to the dissent, Congress was
specifically trying to deter criminals from assaulting federal officers by aggravating
punishment. Id. A key element of an aggravated assault statute is the knowledge of the
accused, otherwise "[w]here an assailant [has] no such knowledge, he could not of
course be deterred by the statutory threat of enhanced punishment." Id. at 698.
81. The Ninth Circuit summed it up best when it stated that "section 2314 is aimed
at the evils of theft, fraud, and counterfeiting and not at the regulation of interstate
transportation." United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 891 (9th Cir. 1970).
82. See supra note 4 (describing possible gaps in state authority).
83. In this case, because the thief knows that the goods are stolen, he is not acting
innocently when he transports or causes the goods to flow in the stream of interstate
commerce. Thus, the transportation element is not covered by the judicial presumption
in favor of mens rea for elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct. For more
on this presumption, see United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72
(1994).
84. See supra note 3.
85. For an in depth look at the relevant statutory language, see discussion infra
Part III.A.
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the broad purposes behind the NSPA and the causing alternative. This
section will begin by taking a more detailed look at the significant
language contained within the NSPA and the causing alternative. In
connection to the language, this section also analyzes the structure
within which both of these statutes operate. The second part of this
section explores the different modes of analysis various courts use to
interpret these statutes. These divergent interpretations help to explain
the inconsistent decisions that the courts reach.
In sum, this section serves to illustrate the need for an authoritative
interpretation regarding the interrelation of both these provisions of the
law. Since these laws were enacted over fifty years ago, the courts have
not agreed on a consistent interpretation as to what the law requires. The
Supreme Court or Congress must step in to lay the matter to rest in order
to avoid potentially inconsistent and unfair outcomes.m
A. Revisions, Insertions, and Deletions
A detailed look at the specific laws that Congress enacted must be
undertaken in order to understand the confusion that has prevailed
among the circuit courts. The NSPA and the causing alternative are both
characterized by statutory revision and insertions or deletions of key
statutory language."' Different courts attach varying degrees of
significance to these alterations. As the ensuing discussion suggests,
this is a major source of confusion among the courts.
The logical starting point in the analysis is the NSPA itself. The
current version of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 provides, in relevant part:
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign commerce
any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of S5,000 or
more, knoowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud...
[s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1994).
88. For more on this assertion, see infra Part VII.
89. See infra notes 98-104, 107-08 and accompanying text. For an extremely
detailed analysis of the congressional record and purposes underlying 18 U.S.C. § 2314.
see McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 649-59 (1982).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994). The second paragraph is omitted because it pertains
to transporting persons in interstate commerce, a topic beyond the scope of this
Comment. See id. The third paragraph deals primarily in securities, which are covered
in the treatment of the first paragraph. See id. The fourth paragraph relates to stolen
traveler's checks, which are covered implicitly in the treatment of other kinds of checks.
In order to analyze this statutory crime enacted by Congress, it must be
broken down into three primary elements, which can be stated in general
terms: (1) transporting goods in interstate commerce, (2) goods must
have the value of five thousand dollars or more, and (3) defendant must
"know" the goods are stolen." The meanings of the second and third
elements of the crime are clear and well settled. The second element is a
simple value threshold and for the purposes of this Comment it will be
assumed to be satisfied.' The third element is the only one that
expressly contains a mens rea requirement. The word "knowing" in a
criminal statutory provision traditionally requires a showing that the
defendant acted with knowledge of the relevant element of the crime."
In this case, "knowing" means that the defendant must have known that
the goods he was transporting were in fact stolen.94
See id. The fifth paragraph deals with transporting counterfeit tax stamps and is also
beyond the scope of this Comment. See id.
91. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9 (1954) (delineating the
statutory elements of the NSPA, but implicitly assuming the five thousand dollar
element); see also United States v. Freeman, 619 F.2d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980)
(delineating an alternative breakdown of the same general statutory elements).
92. The purpose of the five thousand dollar value threshold is to limit the use of
federal resources to matters involving substantial value. "There is no legitimate interest
of [defendants] ... which Congress the sought to protect by this requirement." United
States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 394 (2d Cir. 1966) (quoting United States v. Schaffer,
266 F.2d 435, 440 (2d Cir. 1959)) (alteration in original). The purpose of the monetary
requirement is to avoid overtaxing the federal government. Id. Market value is the
standard in determining the value of the transported stolen goods. See, e.g., Anderson v.
United States, 406 F.2d 529, 534 (8th Cir. 1969). Individual shipments as to an
individual defendant may be aggregated to meet the monetary limit if they are so related
that they may be properly charged as a single offense. See Schaffer v. United States, 362
U.S. 511, 512, 512 n.2, 517 (1960). For an in-depth look at the practical and legal
aspects of the value requirement, see generally Margaret Shulenberger, Annotation,
Determination of Value of Stolen Property Within Meaning of Provision of 18 U.S.C.S. §
2314 Proscribing Interstate or Foreign Transportation of Stolen Goods, Wares,
Merchandise, Securities, or Money, of Value of $5,000 or More, 15 A.L.R. FED. 336
(1973). See also 66 AM. JUR. 2D Receiving and Transporting Stolen Property § 43
(1973) (examining the value requirement of the NSPA); Randy Gidseg et al., Intellectual
Property Crimes, 36 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 835, 843-44 (1999) (evaluating the monetary
value requirement of the NSPA in the trade secret context).
93. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68-70 (1994)
(interpreting whether the mens rea requirement created by the word "knowingly,"
attached to the transportation element of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (child pornography statute),
applies to the age of performer requirement); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)
(1985).
94. It does not matter whether the defendant is guilty of any crime with respect to
the wrongful taking of the goods. See Johnson v. United States, 207 F.2d 314, 319 (5th
Cir. 1953). The method through which the defendant acquired the goods is only relevant
when used to prove actual knowledge that the goods were in fact stolen. Id.; see also
Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, What Constitutes "Constructive" Possession of Stolen
Property to Establish Requisite Element of Possession Supporting Offense of Receiving
Stolen Property, 30 A.L.R.4TH 488 (1984) (analyzing instances where constructive
possession satisfies the stolen goods element of the NSPA); Annotation, What
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As is readily apparent, on the face of the NSPA there is no language
creating mens rea attached to the first element of the crime. The
provision seems to be clear: "Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers
in interstate or foreign commerce .. . ." Ordinarily the absence of mens
rea language with respect to a jurisdictional element of the crime would
be the end of the inquiry.9 Unfortunately, contemporaneous acts taken
by Congress may be interpreted by the courts as impliedly creating a
mental state requirement for this element of the crime.' This Comment
now turns to these changes in the statutory scheme.
The version of the NSPA currently on the books was enacted by
Congress in 1948, consolidating five predecessor sections of the code."
The relevant predecessor section to the current NSPA provided for
causation in element one.9 It read: "[w]hoever shall transport or cause
to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce. . ."" Prior to
1948, criminal liability for those who caused interstate transportation
was contained entirely within the NSPA. Given the absence of any
mens rea language, there was no plausible claim that a mental state
requirement attached to the transportation element; the transportation
element merely conferred federal jurisdiction.
Ironically, matters became more complicated in 1948 when Congress
attempted to simplify federal criminal law. In the 1948 revision of the
federal code, the NSPA was stripped of its causation language." ' This
was due to the fact that Congress had created 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) in the
same revision of the law." The causing alternative was added by
Congress to the United States Code in order "to permit the deletion from
Constitutes "Recently" Stolen Property Within Rule Inferring Guilt front Unerplained
Possession of Such Property, 89 A.L.R3D 1202 (1979) (analyzing the temporal asp.ct of
the theft element of the NSPA); 66 AMi. JUM. 2D Receiving and Transporting Stolen
Property § 41 (1973) (analyzing the theft element of the NSPA).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 2314.
96. See discussion supra Part II.B.
97. Specifically, the acts taken by Congress were the creation of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b)
and the subsequent insertion of the word "willfully." See 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1994)
(change noted in amendments).
98. The congressional act of 1948 consolidated former §§ 413, 415, 417, 418,
418a, and 419 of title 18 of the 1940 edition of the United States Code. See 18 U.S.C. §
2314 historical & revision notes.
99. Act of Aug. 3, 1939, ch. 413, § 415,53 Stat. 1178 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2314 (1994)).
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 historical & revision notes.
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(b).
many sections throughout the revision of such phrases as 'causes or
procures.' ' °3 The causing alternative was a stylistic reform of the code,
but it also served to reaffirm the congressional purpose that those who
cause crimes to be committed will be punished." In practical effect, the
causing alternative:
removes all doubt that one who puts in motion or assists in the illegal enterprise
but causes the commission of an indispensable element of the offense by an
innocent agent or instrumentality, is guilty as a principal even though he
intentionally refrained from the direct act constituting the completed offense.'
The specific language within the causing alternative has engendered
the majority of the mens rea controversy. The original causing
alternative read as follows: "Whoever causes an act to be done, which if
directly performed by him would be an offense against the United States,
is also a principal and punishable as such."'" Consistent with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2314, there was no mens rea requirement expressed on the face of 18
U.S.C § 2(b). This changed, however, in 1951 when Congress further
revised the causing alternative by inserting the word "willfully."'" Thus,
the statute now reads: "Whoever willfully causes an act to be
done... ."'0' Because Congress did not elaborate on the purposes
behind the insertion of "willfully,"' it is not clear whether Congress
intended to create a mens rea requirement for all causation crimes."'
Traditionally, the word "willfully" in criminal statutes refers to the
higher levels of mens rea culpability."' In many instances, "willfully" is
103. Id. historical & revision notes.
104. Id.
105. Id. For more on the purposes behind the causing alternative, see Blakey &
Roddy, supra note 10, at 1410-19 (discussing the causing alternative).
106. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 684.
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b).
108. Id.
109. The relevant Senate Report clarified a contemporaneous change in the law but
did not even bother to mention the addition of the word "willfully." See S. REP. No. 82-
1020, § 17b (1951), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2578, 2583.
110. For an argument that Congress inserted the word "willfully" in response to
Judge Learned Hand's criticism that 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) had no express mens rea
requirement, see Blakey & Roddy, supra note 10, at 1411 ("Ironically, Congress added
'willfully' to § 2(b) after criticism from Judge Learned Hand that no state of mind was
expressed on the face of the statute."). Judge Hand openly criticized 18 U.S.C § 2(b) in
United States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903, 909-10 (2d Cir. 1950) (holding that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(b) contains an implicit mens rea requirement because Congress could not have
"intended so drastically to enlarge criminal liability" when it enacted the law).
111. The Supreme Court has held that "willfully" is "a 'word of many meanings,'
and 'its construction [is] often ... influenced by its context."' Ratzlaf v. United States,
510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994) (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943)). In
general, "willfully" imposes a mens rea requirement of intent. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at
141; see also WORKING PAPERS, supra note 62 (discussing the Supreme Court's
treatment of "willfully" in federal criminal statutes); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 142
[VoL. 38: 629,2001] Punishing the Causer as the Principal
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
interpreted as requiring a showing of the defendant's intent. In the
present context, "willfully" has created a dilemma for courts attempting
to establish the proper relationship between the causing alternative and
the NSPA. First, the court must decide whether Congress intended to
create a mental state requirement for causation liability. Second, the
court must decide to which element of the crime this mens rea
requirement attaches."' The second inquiry has proven to be the most
difficult.
As the next section will explore, the courts are inconsistent in
answering these questions. In fact, the circuits vary wildly in their
outcomes.' 3  Some courts argue that the causing alternative applies
exclusively to those who cause interstate transportation and the language
contained therein creates a mens rea requirement."' Other courts argue
that there is no distinction between those who transport and those who
cause such transportation."5  The purpose of this section will be to
illustrate that this general confusion is in part created by the statutory
scheme set up by Congress. In addition, the difficulty in trying to prove
the exact nature of the statutory scheme intended by Congress will serve
to reinforce the validity of the jurisdictional only argument in this
context.
(1998) (discussing "willfulness" in federal criminal statutes).
112. The problem is that if "willfully" does create a mental state requirement, it will
apply differently under different substantive provisions of the federal code. For
example, in United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 568-69 (3d Cir. 1994), the Third
Circuit held that "willfully" creates a mens rea of intent to cause election treasurers to
submit false reports to the Federal Election Commission in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1001.
."Willfulness' in this context is an important component of section 2(b). and it is
necessary that the term be understood." Id.
113. For instance, consider the following line of cases issued by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, which illustrates the confusion in this area of the law. In United States
v. Scandifla, 390 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds sub noma. Giordano
v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969), the court held that § 2(b) created a mens rea
requirement attached to the transportation element of the crime. Id. at 249. Two years
later, in United States v. Mingoia, 424 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1970). the Second Circuit held
that no mens rea was required. Id. at 713. Finally, in United States v DeKunchak, 467
F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1972), the court contradicted itself again and held that reasonable
foreseeability was required by § 2(b). See id. at 436-37. The problem is that all three
cases are still considered good law. In fact, Scandifia was recently cited by the First
Circuit as persuasive authority. See United States v. Leppo, 177 F.3d 93, 96-97 (1st Cir.
1999).
114. See, eg., Leppo, 177 F.3d at 95-97.
115. See supra note 49.
B. Will the Courts Ever Agree?
Since the 1948 statutory revision,"6 which established the causing
alternative, courts have been unable to agree conclusively upon the
proper construction of the statutory scheme set up by Congress. This
section discusses the two primary modes of analysis undertaken by
courts in addressing this problem. The first mode of analysis comes to
the conclusion that there is a mens rea requirement for interstate
transportation, while the second reaches the opposite conclusion that no
mens rea showing is required. The purpose of this section is to illustrate
that much of the analysis surrounding this particular issue is flawed due
to the ambiguous nature of the statutory scheme.
The first mode of analysis employed by the courts embarks on a quest
to prove that the causing alternative creates a mens rea requirement in
relation to the interstate transportation element of the NSPA."7 These
courts make a bright line distinction between transporters and those who
cause others to act. " s These courts argue that, by definition, the NSPA
applies only to a person who transports. For example, if Fast Eddie
obtains checks he knows are stolen in New York and takes them with
him to Montana, then he would be charged as a transporter under the
NSPA. In addition, courts who subscribe to this analysis further argue
that the causing alternative automatically kicks in when the charge is for
causing one to transport."9 Thus, in the previous example if Fast Eddie
had cashed the checks in New York instead, and then they traveled to a
drawee bank in Florida as part of a routine cashing practice, he would be
charged as causing the crime to happen under the sole authority of the
causing alternative.
Once under the authority of the causing alternative, these courts argue
that the "willfully" language creates a mens rea requirement that applies
to the interstate transportation element of the crime.'20 Implicitly these
courts make the connection by arguing that what specifically is being
caused is interstate transportation. Since the statute requires a person
willfully to cause, these courts conclude that there is a mens rea
requirement attached to causing interstate transportation.
While this argument makes sense in logical terms, it fails to take into
account the jurisdictional nature of the transportation element and the
116. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
117. The First Circuit employs this statutory interpretation. See Leppo, 177 F.3d at
94-97.
118. See id. at 95 ("Section 2314 applies to transporters; § 2(b) to one who willfully
causes one to act.").
119. See id.; United States v. Sabatino, 943 F.2d 94, 99-100 (1st Cir. 1991).
120. See Leppo, 177 F.3d at 96-97.
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congressional purpose behind the law. The jurisdictional only nature
of the transportation element trumps any subsequent mens rea
requirements judicially read into that part of the crime.', It is
contradictory for courts to read a mens rea requirement into an element
that was created for jurisdictional purposes only.' -  In short, even if
these courts are correct in interpreting the relationship of the causing
alternative to any particular statute, this analysis is not relevant to
transportation under the NSPA because mens rea requirements are not
applicable to that element in the first place.
Similarly, in many of the court decisions that hold that there is no
mens rea requirement, courts found themselves preoccupied by the
statutory interpretation question.'4 These courts find no distinction in
application between those who transport and those who cause others to
transport.'z They reason that causation liability is still implicitly
provided for in the NSPA itself and that the causing alternative is meant
solely as a reassurance that causation liability exists.'" Some courts go
as far as to proclaim that the causing alternative is "mere surplusage to
be ignored."''  This type of statement reflects the mistaken assumption
made by courts that cause is implicitly provided for by the National
Stolen Property Act itself.
Other courts simply sidestep the statutory construction question
altogether.'2 These courts reason that it is unnecessary to figure out
whether mens rea is actually required by the statute because any
requisite level of mens rea can be inferred from the character of the
defendant's scheme.'9 This analysis effectively sidesteps the
121. See discussion supra Part Il.B.
122. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 684 (1975).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Lack, 129 F.3d 403, 409-10 (7th Cir. 1997).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Lennon, 751 F.2d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 1985).
126. For example, in Lennon, the Fifth Circuit held that the National Stolen
Property Act expressly contained provision for those who cause. Id. at 741. This
conclusion is clearly mistaken since there is no causation liability language in the current
18 U.S.C. § 2314 for those who cause interstate transportation of stolen goods. See
supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text. The only instance where cause appears is in
the second paragraph of the statute, which specifically refers to the interstate
transportation of persons in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. 18 U.S.C. § 2314
(1994).
127. Lennon, 751 F.2d at 741 (citing United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 324 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1983)).
128. This form of analysis stems from the Supreme Court's decision in Pereira V.
United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9 (1954).
129. See iL
disagreement at issue, but works only in the limited number of actual
cases where mens rea as to interstate transportation can be inferred
automatically from the circumstances. '
The following section takes up this inferential mode of analysis in
greater detail. This was the approach utilized by the Supreme Court in
its only decision directly relevant to the issue at hand)3' As the section
discusses, this analysis is limited in application and lends itself to
overextension by the courts. This in turn further adds to the
inconsistency among the already confused courts. The Supreme Court
must revisit this decision in order to put to rest any and all sources for
conflicting rules of prosecution.
IV. SIDESTEPPING THE ISSUE: PEREIRA V. UNITED STATES
As previously noted, the Supreme Court is in part responsible for the
confusion among the federal circuit courts. This is due to the fact that in
Pereira v. United States,' the Court effectively sidestepped the mens
rea issue in connection to causing violations of the interstate
transportation element of the crime.'33 The Court relied on the
assumption that any level of mens rea was automatically inferable from
the defendant's activities.' 3 While undoubtedly a proper decision given
the facts of the case,'35 it failed to decide the mens rea issue in cases
130. In Pereira, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's intent to cause
interstate transportation was inferable from the fact that he cashed a check drawn on an
out-of-state bank. Id.; see also supra note 59. Obviously, this reasoning is not
applicable when both banks are in the same state, but for some reason completely
unknown to the defendant the check travels across state lines. This was the situation the
Eighth Circuit faced in United States v. Ludwig, 523 F.2d 705, 706, 708 (8th Cir. 1975),
and the D.C. Circuit faced in United States v. Scarborough, 813 F.2d 1244, 1245-46
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (check deposited and drawn on District of Columbia banks, but
unknown to the defendants the check traveled to the Federal Reserve bank in Maryland
"in the normal course of the check clearing process").
13 1. See Pereira, 347 U.S. at 9.
132. 347 U.S. 1.
133. The Court did not discuss whether Congress intended to attach a mens rea
requirement to the interstate transportation element of the crime. See id. at 8-10. Also,
the Court did not address whether 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), as applied in the 18 U.S.C. § 2314
context, externally created a mens rea requirement attached to the interstate element of
the crime. See id.
134. As applied to the particular defendants in the case, the Court reasoned that:
When Pereira delivered the check, drawn on an out-of-state bank, to the
[cashing] bank for collection, he "caused" it to be transported in interstate
commerce. It is common knowledge that such checks must be sent to the
drawee bank for collection, and it follows that Pereira intended the [cashing]
bank to send this check across state lines.
Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
135. It is certainly reasonable to assume that people know that cashing a check,
drawn on an out-of-state bank, will cause it to travel across state lines. Therefore, it
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where the Court's inference did not apply.'" In particular, what would
happen when mens rea was not automatically inferable from the
defendant's conduct?
The particular facts in Pereira are a useful tool to help in
understanding the mens rea problem at issue in this Comment. In
Pereira, the defendants, Pereira and Brading, were charged with
violating the NSPA by causing checks, which were obtained through a
fraudulent scheme, to travel in interstate commerce." Pereira and
Brading had set up a scheme to defraud a wealthy widow of her
money.' 3' Pereira set himself out to be a wealthy entrepreneur involved
primarily in motel development deals.9 Brading's role in the scheme
was to provide credibility for Pereira's assertions.'o In furtherance of
his scheme Pereira went so far as to marry his victim, in order to galn
her confidence, so that he could swindle her of her money."'
The facts leading to the criminal charges occurred when Pereira
obtained a $35,000 check from his spouse for the purposes of a fictional
motel deal, which he immediately cashed in the course of his subsequent
flight. '4 The check, as it turned out, was drawn on an out-of-state
bank.' 3 Consequently, when Pereira cashed the check, he violated the
NSPA because he caused it to travel across state lines.
The defendants challenged their convictions on the grounds that there
was no evidence that they mailed or transported anything in interstate
commerce themselves.'" This defense was quickly shot down, and
would not have been logically plausible for the defendant to argue that he did not intend
to cause interstate transportation because when he cashed the check he knew that
interstate transportation was practically certain to occur. Id.
136. See supra note 130.
137. 347 U.S. at 3. The defendants were also charged with committing a violation
of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and with conspiracy to commit both crimes.ldL




142. Id. at 5.
143. Md
144. ld. at 7 (applying this defense to the substantive counts only). The defendants
challenged the conspiracy counts on the further ground that punishing for both the
substantive crime and conspiracy constituted double jeopardy. Id. at 11. The Supreme
Court held that a substantive crime and the conspiracy to commit it are separate and
distinct offenses. Id. (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640. 643-44 (1946j).
Thus, a defense of double jeopardy is futile. For articles offering a complete treatment
of the principle of allowing defendants to be charged with both conspiracy and
rightfully so. In reaching its decision, the Court held that to support a
conviction "it is not necessary to show that petitioners actually mailed or
transported anything themselves; it is sufficient if they caused it to be
done."'45 The conclusion drawn by the Court was in no way surprising,
because it went to the heart of the causing alternative, which is geared
toward punishing those who cause the criminal acts to be done.
Needless to say, their defense was ill advised, because causation had
been clearly established. Instead of challenging on causation grounds,
the best available defense would have been to challenge on the basis of
the lack of an arguably required mens rea showing attached to the
transportation element of the crime.'46
The significance of Pereira was not the actual outcome of the case;
instead, it was the method of analysis the Supreme Court laid down
concerning the mens rea issue. The Court did not engage in the statutory
construction issues discussed in the previous section and, alternatively,
did not address the congressional purpose in passing the NSPA in regard
to the transportation element. 47  As a substitute for this analysis, the
Court relied on a logical, common sense assumption. The Court held,
"It is common knowledge that such checks must be sent to the drawee
bank for collection, and it follows that Pereira intended the [cashing]
bank to send this check across state lines."'48 In other words, the Court
inferred from the facts of the case that when Pereira cashed the check he
knew it would travel interstate because it was drawn on an out-of-state
bank. As a corollary to this inference, there could have been no
plausible claim that he did not act with the requisite mental culpability
of any proposed level of mens rea because he intentionally cashed the
check knowing it would travel. Therefore, under this analysis it is
unnecessary to discuss the mens rea requirement issue because the
defendant is guilty regardless.
The problem with this analysis is that it is limited in application to
those circumstances in which a guilty mind is automatically inferable.
substantive offenses in the federal system, see Susan W. Brenner, Of Complicity and
Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton Liability to RICO Actions, 56 Mo. L. REv.
931 (1991) (discussing the application of Pinkerton liability in the federal criminal
justice system); Susan W. Brenner, RICO, CCE, and Other Complex Crimes: The
Transformation of American Criminal Law?, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 239 (1993)
(describing compound liability in the federal criminal justice system).
145. Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8.
146. It is not clear from the facts of the case whether the defendants would have
actually benefited from a strict mens rea requirement. Given the facts of the case, to
satisfy a mens rea requirement, the government would have had to prove that Pereira
knew the check was drawn from an out-of-state bank. Id. at 5.
147. It is important to note that, although this was a causation case, the Court does
not discuss 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) anywhere in its relevant analysis. See id. at 9- 10.
148. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
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There are a multitude of cases in which this inference will not be
applicable; thus, the courts will be forced to address the statutory
interpretation issue. For example, what if the cashing bank and the
drawee bank were in the same state, but for reasons completely unknown
to the defendant the check traveled interstate?' 9 The Pereira inference
is no longer applicable in these instances because the actor has not
conclusively manifested his intent to cause interstate transportation.
Lacking any manifestation of intent, the most that can be said is that the
actor was a cause-in-fact of interstate transportation. Thus, in these
types of cases the courts are not allowed the luxury of being able to
sidestep the mens rea issue with simple logical assumptions.
The next section explores the erratic course of federal appellate court
decisions after Pereira. This confusion is due in large part to the
Supreme Court's narrow holding in Pereira. The courts of appeals have
been left to their own devices when it comes to cases to which the
Pereira inference does not apply.' ' As was previously discussed, courts
have not been able to agree on a consistent method of interpreting the
statutory scheme set up by Congress.' Thus, the void left by the lack of
clear Supreme Court or congressional guidance is filled by varying and
inconsistent circuit court decisions. This inconsistency does not bode
well for a fair criminal process. Given the often decisive nature of mens
rea requirements,' 2 the likelihood of conviction may well turn on the
federal circuit in which the defendant is prosecuted.
V. DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE COURTS AFTER PEREIRA
Soon after the Supreme Court's decision in Pereira, a growing
majority of the circuit courts began to adopt the "no mens rea required"
149. For instances in which the court faced this predicament, see supra note 130. In
both of those cases the adjudicating court relied on the jurisdictional element argument
discussed supra Part II.B.
150. The circuit courts do not cite to Pereira as authority for their holdings on the
mens rea issue. In fact the circuit courts cite to Pereira only for the proposition that the
defendants need not transport anything themselves in order to violate the statute. See
United States v. Lack, 129 F.3d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sparrow. 614
F.2d 229, 232 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Newson, 531 F.2d 979, 981 (10th Cir.
1976); United States v. Ludwig, 523 F.2d 705, 706 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Masters, 456 F.2d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Mingoia, 424 F.2d 710.
711 (2d Cir. 1970).
151. Compare, e.g., United States v. Leppo, 177 F.3d 93, 96-97 (ist Cir. 1999)
(mens rea required), with Ludwig, 523 F.2d at 706-08 (no mens rea required).
152 See supra note 19.
rule.'53 Although there was some general continuity in outcome, there
was no continuity in terms of the reasoning behind the rule. The
disagreement as to the proper way to approach the issue opened the door
to new and divergent interpretations as to what the law requires.'
As was discussed in the previous section, the disagreement is most
acute when the Pereira inference is not applicable. For example, what if
the cashing and drawee banks were in the same state? Some courts
would attack the problem by disregarding the causing alternative and
holding that cause is provided for by the NSPA itself.'" In the absence
of any explicit mens rea language attaching to the transportation
element, these courts would hold that mere evidence that the stolen
check crossed state lines is enough.5 6 If this line of analysis is indeed
proper, it opens the door to potentially conflicting outcomes. Other
courts have interpreted the NSPA as being dependent upon the causing
alternative entirely and hold that "willfully" creates a mens rea
requirement for the transportation element.'57 This argument is plausible
due to the fact that there has been no authoritative decision regarding the
true source of causation liability in the National Stolen Property Act
context.'58
Another distinct line of cases has uncovered the true nature of the
inquiry." 9 These cases apply the Feola jurisdictional element principle
to causing transportation under the NSPA 6° For example, in United
States v. Ludwig,'61 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with a
situation in which the cashing bank and the drawee bank were in the
same state. 62 Hence, the Pereira inference was not directly applicable.
Instead of jumping into the statutory construction issue directly, the
Eighth Circuit decided to take a broader look at the issue. The court
153. See supra note 49.
154. Amid the confusion, the First Circuit recently revived the mcns rea
requirement for the transportation element of the NSPA. See Leppo, 177 F.3d at 96-97.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Lennon, 751 F.2d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 1985).
156. See supra note 42 (citing cases within text of Leppo, 177 F.3d 93).
157. See, e.g., Leppo, 177 F.3d at 97.
158. As was previously discussed, the Supreme Court in Pereira v. United States,
347 U.S. 1 (1954), did not address the interrelationship of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b), 2314, and
whether a mens rea requirement should be read into the transportation element of the
crime. Id. at 9-10.
159. See supra note 3.
160. See supra note 3.
161. 523 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1975).
162. Id. at 706. The defendants cashed fraudulently obtained checks, from a
Missouri bank and later drawn on a Missouri bank. Id. The check happened to travel in
interstate commerce because of circumstances beyond the knowledge of the defendants.
Id. at 708 ("We have found no previous case in which the drawee bank and the
depository bank were located in the same state, and thus we have found no case in which
the issue of [mens rea] has been so sharply presented as here.").
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correctly identified the issue when it framed the inquiry as follows:
"Whether the [NSPA] requires, at a minimum, that such interstate
transportation be reasonably foreseeable is, of course, a question of
congressional intent."' 3 The Eighth Circuit went on to hold, as was also
concluded by the Supreme Court in United States v. Feola," that when
mens rea is not clearly provided for, the congressional purpose behind
the statute determines whether it should be read in by the courts."'
In Ludwig, the court held that the purpose behind the transportation
element of the NSPA is to "provide a constitutional basis for the
exercise of federal power."' ' Since the interstate transportation element
of the crime was merely jurisdictional, a mens rea requirement would
frustrate the purposes of the rule. Therefore, it would be improper to
read any mental requirement into the rule.
Although the Ludwig "jurisdictional only" line of cases rests soundly
upon Supreme Court precedent,6 responds to the purposes Congress had
in making the law,'6s and deals with the specific language contained in
the statute,'" it has not ended the disagreement between the courts."'
Despite the fact that these courts purport to have solved the problem in
accordance with established Supreme Court principles, other courts
continue to disagree. This conflict is due in large part to the continuing
preoccupation by certain courts with the distinction between transporting
and causing one to transport, which leads to inconsistent outcomes
because different courts offer their own answer to the statutory
construction question.
The following section briefly summarizes and evaluates the competing
views on the mental state issue and states this Comment's conclusions.
At the bare minimum it is self evident that a Pereira type analysis is
sufficient when the rule clearly applies. When a Pereira type analysis
does not apply, the best alternative analysis focuses on the purposes
163. IkL at 706.
164. See supra Part ll.B.
165. See Ludiwig, 523 F.2d at 706-07.
166. Id. at 707 (quoting United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879. 891 t(th Cir. 19701;.
accord United States v. Scarborough, 813 F.2d 1244, 1245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United
States v. Newson, 531 F.2d 979, 981 (10th Cir. 1976).
167. This reasoning is parallel to the Feola principle. See United States v. Feola.
420 U.S. 671, 676-85 (1975).
168. See McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 649-59 (1982).
169. See Ludwig, 523 F.2d at 707.
170. See United States v. Leppo, 177 F.3d 93, 95-97 (1st Cir. 1999) (providing a
concise overview of "wide national disagreement" on the subject).
behind the NSPA and concludes that mens rea is not applicable to the
transportation element of the crime because it is jurisdictional only.
Analyses that attempt to distinguish between transporting and those who
cause transporting are faulty and ultimately will render inconsistent
results.
VI. MAKING SENSE OF IT ALL: UNDERSTANDING THE DRIVING
FORCES BEHIND THE COMPETING RULES
The circuit courts of appeals generally conclude that no mens
rea requirement attaches to the element of causing interstate
transportation."T' These courts have fostered conflicting rules because
they have not been able to come to agreement as to the proper way to
interpret the relevant law.
There are three general forms of analysis which courts utilize in
reaching the no mens rea rule. The first method involves focusing on the
statutory language of the NSPA and concluding that there is no explicit
mens rea requirement attached to transportation. This method declines
to distinguish between transporting and causing one to transport and
argues that the NSPA is the sole determinant of mens rea."'
As pointed out in the previous discussion, there are two faults in this
mode of analysis. First, it does not take into account the jurisdictional
nature of the transportation element. While the conclusion reached is
ultimately correct, the lack of jurisdictional only analysis leaves it open
to attack as the second problem illustrates. The second problem is that
focusing on the statutory language leaves open the possibility that the
causing alternative may in fact be the true source of causation liability.
This is true because the issue has not been decided authoritatively.
Thus, in the end, courts that focus on the statutory language are led
down an empty path that offers more questions than answers.
The second form of analysis utilizes the type of guilty mind inference
employed by the Supreme Court in Pereira v. United States.'73 These
courts infer from the circumstances that the defendant must have
intended to cause interstate transportation of stolen goods. Such
reasoning is applicable only when the facts of the case warrant an
automatic inference that the defendant acted with a guilty mind. Since
there is no opportunity to rebut the presumption of mens rea in this type
of case, there is no need to determine whether mens rea is actually
required.
171. See supra note 49.
172. See, e.g., United States v. Newson, 531 F.2d 979, 980-81 (10th Cir. 1976).
173. 347 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1954); see also supra Part IV.
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The problem with the Pereira approach is that it is limited by its very
terms and the analysis breaks down when mens rea is not inferable from
the facts of the case. In effect, the Pereira approach merely sidesteps
the issue and does not end the confusion between the courts."
The final mode of analysis, if accepted across the board by all the
circuit courts, would offer the greatest level of consistency and
understanding of the statutory scheme created by Congress.'" This
mode of analysis focuses on the jurisdictional nature of the
transportation element of the crime. This interpretation of the scheme
comes to terms with the congressional purpose behind the NSPA which
is to punish fraudulent activity that eludes the power of the states. ' In
addition, this position is in accord with the rule of federal statutory
interpretation laid down by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Feola.'" Requiring mens rea might frustrate the purposes behind the
insertion of the transportation element.' ' Thus, by concluding that
no mens rea requirement is applicable to the interstate transportation
element of the crime, courts avoid determining the exact purposes of the
statutory language contained in the rules.
Since the circuit courts continue to disagree, and no end appears in
sight, 79 it is necessary to explore other avenues to settle this
disagreement. The final section concludes by proposing simple
reformatory measures for use by the Supreme Court or Congress. These
measures would resolve the inconsistencies among courts and result in a
single rule for prosecution.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SUPREME COURT AND
FUTURE CODE REVISERS
The Supreme Court could end the confusion among the circuit courts
by specifically extending the holding in United States v. Feola'" to
prosecutions for causing violations of the NSPA. This extension would
lay to rest any plausible assertion that the transportation element of the
174. See discussion supra Part IV.
175. See discussion supra Part II.B; see also supra note 4.
176. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
177. 420 U.S. 671, 676-77 n.9 (1975); see also discussion supra Part ll.B.
178. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying texL
179. Just when the issue seemed to be settled, the First Circuit vigorously revived
the mens rea issue. See United States v. Leppo, 177 F.3d 93, 96-97 tlst Cir. 1999).
Because the case is so new, it remains to be seen whether other circuits will follow suit.
180. 420 U.S. at 686.
659
crime carries with it a mens rea requirement."'
Alternatively, future congressional code revisers could step in to
resolve the matter in two ways. First, if Congress wants no mens rea
requirement, it should strike the word "willfully" from the causing
alternative. This revision would address any confusion surrounding
mens rea. Second, if Congress accepts a mens rea requirement for the
interstate transportation element of the crime, it should insert relevant
statutory language to indicate such.' 2 These simple textual alterations
would end the debate surrounding mens rea as it relates to causing
interstate transportation of stolen goods. ,83
These changes in the federal system must be implemented in order to
promote a fairer system of criminal justice. It is somewhat arbitrary for
a criminal defendant's fate to rest on the federal jurisdiction in which he
will be charged. Until some authoritative changes are made, the circuit
courts will continue to disagree, and thus will apply conflicting rules for
prosecution.
JORGE C. GONZALEZ
181. The Supreme Court turned down a golden opportunity to lay this matter to rest
when it denied certiorari in United States v. Leppo, 177 F.3d 93, cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
501 (1999).
182. For example, the word "knowingly" could be inserted to modify "transports"
in 18 U.S.C. § 2314. For an example of a statute that expressly uses the mens rea of
knowledge to attach to the transportation element of the crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 2252
(1994). For a case evaluating the mens rea elements created by this statute, see United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 67-78 (1994).
183. It is important that the statutory language be revised. A simple congressional
interpretation at this point in time will not suffice as the views of the current Congress
regarding the meaning of an act passed by an earlier Congress are not ordinarily of great
weight under the rules of statutory construction. See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 77
n.6. Thus, inserting a word traditionally used to create a mens rea requirement, for
example "knowingly," into the statute would constitute irrefutable proof of Congress's
intent to include a mental state as an element of the crime. In Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), the Supreme Court summed up this principle as follows:
And where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal
tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts
the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of
learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the
judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.
Id. at 263.
